https://www.socictopen.socict.org/files/original/73f18c35becd4283632ea58dccccba19.pdf 3d54f1ed85ecfdf5470fb8bab4e36e8c Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Coronavirus Description An account of the resource Dominio científico: Coronavirus Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Self-interest versus group-interest in antiviral control. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Michiel van Boven, Don Klinkenberg, Ido Pen, Franz J. Weissing, Hans Heesterbeek Description An account of the resource Antiviral agents have been hailed to hold considerable promise for the treatment and prevention of emerging viral diseases like H5N1 avian influenza and SARS. However, antiviral drugs are not completely harmless, and the conditions under which individuals are willing to participate in a large-scale antiviral drug treatment program are as yet unknown. We provide population dynamical and game theoretical analyses of large-scale prophylactic antiviral treatment programs. Throughout we compare the antiviral control strategy that is optimal from the public health perspective with the control strategy that would evolve if individuals make their own, rational decisions. To this end we investigate the conditions under which a large-scale antiviral control program can prevent an epidemic, and we analyze at what point in an unfolding epidemic the risk of infection starts to outweigh the cost of antiviral treatment. This enables investigation of how the optimal control strategy is moulded by the efficacy of antiviral drugs, the risk of mortality by antiviral prophylaxis, and the transmissibility of the pathogen. Our analyses show that there can be a strong incentive for an individual to take less antiviral drugs than is optimal from the public health perspective. In particular, when public health asks for early and aggressive control to prevent or curb an emerging pathogen, for the individual antiviral drug treatment is attractive only when the risk of infection has become non-negligible. It is even possible that from a public health perspective a situation in which everybody takes antiviral drugs is optimal, while the process of individual choice leads to a situation where nobody is willing to take antiviral drugs. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 2008 Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0001558 Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived PLoS ONE Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Public Library of Science (PLoS) Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Science, Medicine Language A language of the resource EN